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Article: 
In the 1984 elections in the United States some of the candidates were criticized for advocating public policies 
that conflicted with the teachings of their churches. Chief among such targets of this criticism were Catholics, 
such as Geraldine Ferraro and Mario Cuomo, who defended permissive abortion laws while maintaining that in 
private they regard abortion as morally wrong. The purpose of this essay is to explore this criticism and to see 
what those under attack (whom I shall call "liberal Catholics") might say in response. And though I shall focus on 
Catholic public officials, it should be clear that the criticism under consideration need not be restricted to 
Catholics nor to public officials. A Jehovah's Witness who approves of blood transfusions will be open to this 
criticism, and so too will private individuals aligned with "Catholics for Free Choice"1 (or any other person who 
supports permissive abortion laws but whose own church opposes them). 
 
Part I 
As one might expect, there are a number of ambiguities embedded in this criticism, and one task is to sort through 
some of these. To begin and to introduce terminology that is somewhat misleading, I shall ask whether the 
criticism is relativized or absolute. I shall say that the criticism is relativized if the critics, when addressing liberal 
Catholics, mean to be saying, "Since you are a Catholic, you should not support permissive abortion laws." I shall 
say that the criticism is absolute if it is more plausibly construed as saying, "No public official should support 
permissive abortion laws." The absolutist is critical of any public official who supports what is taken to be the 
wrong view. The relativized version of the criticism, however, is aimed at those who fail to be true to their own 
religious principles. 
 
Of course, if one opposes the election of a candidate on absolutist grounds, then that the relativized criticism is 
also applicable may seem incidental. 
 
Yet, when one listens to the critics, it seems clear that some regard the relativized version of the criticism as 
particularly biting, and it is thought to put the candidate in an even worse light. One writer expresses the point this 
way: "People of faith lose their integrity if they fail to view public issues in light of their faith and speak and act 
accordingly."2 Another writes: 
 
Whether one is Protestant, Catholic, Jewish or any faith, those particular religious principles and tenets 
should be a completely transforming influence in one's life, affecting every area and activity of one's 
dealings with others. Otherwise, those who observe have the rights to question the validity of one's 
commitment to that faith.3 
 
The upshot of these remarks, I take it, is that at one level a Catholic who supports permissive abortion laws is 
subject to an important moral criticism that an atheist, for example, can avoid. Unpacking the nature and force of 
this criticism is the main task to be pursued here. 
 
Before embarking on this task, however, other ambiguities need to be pointed out. First, there are two different 
versions of the relativized criticism. According to the weaker version of that Criticism, public officials ought not 
to support policies that they oppose on religious grounds. According to the stronger version, public officials are 
required to work for the enactment of legislation supported by their religious beliefs and to work against 
legislation contrary to those beliefs. Put another way, the weaker view demands that a legislator's agenda not 
conflict with the agenda of his religion, while the stronger view requires that a legislator's agenda must coincide 
with the agenda of his religion. Both the weaker and stronger versions of the criticism condemn legislators who 
vote for a law that is contrary to the tenets of their religion. The idea common to both versions of the criticism is 
that one who supports legislation contrary to his religious beliefs is guilty of betrayal. But the stronger version is 
even more demanding in that it condemns legislators who do not actively work against the passage of such 
legislation. 
 
The second ambiguity concerns the scope of the requirement that the critics say certain officials are guilty of 
violating. Does this requirement apply to all policies? Consider again Catholic public officials. While these 
individuals are often criticized for supporting permissive abortion laws, rarely are they condemned for failing to 
work for the prohibition of artificial means of birth control. Admittedly, advocates of the absolutist version of this 
criticism have made the target broader and have demanded that candidates take the "right" position on school 
prayer, the teaching of creationism, and homosexuality, in addition to abortion. But the narrower criticism is more 
common. At least two explanations of why this is so come to mind. One explanation concerns the gravity of the 
alleged wrongs. Though Catholicism may absolutely prohibit both abortion and artificial birth control, violating 
the former prohibition is by far the graver of the two wrongs.4 So understood, the relativized version of the 
criticism is confined to very grave wrongs. The other explanation is that the weaker version of the relativized 
criticism is being assumed. Since artificial birth control is taken to be legally permissible unless explicitly 
forbidden and since there is no grass roots movement to make it illegal, rarely does a legislator have to face this 
issue.5 But public officials are more often confronted directly with the abortion issue. Since these explanations are 




Let us now see how liberal Catholics might defend their position. One possibility is to argue that though abortions 
ought to be stopped, passing restrictive abortion legislation will not accomplish that end. Other means will be 
more efficacious, such as moral education. Moreover, without a change in moral attitudes, abortions will continue 
to be obtained even though illegal, and this will result in even more harm. Not only will innocent fetuses continue 
to be destroyed, but women will likely be harmed because abortions performed outside a hospital or licensed 
clinic will be less safe. This argument, however, seems implausible because it rests on dubious empirical 
premises. It seems certain that abortions will not stop as long as we have permissive abortion laws. And even if 
restrictive abortion laws do not stop all abortions, surely it will prevent some. In short, if, as common sense 
suggests, there will be fewer abortions in a society that has restrictive abortion laws rather than permissive ones, 
then the argument under consideration cannot support the position of liberal Catholics. Moreover, even if 
restrictive abortion laws were ineffective, it seems that some evils are grave enough that one ought to take a stand 
against them even when doing so will bring about no change. And from the Catholic perspective, abortion is such 
an evil. 
 
Turning to another argument, liberal Catholics sometimes appeal to a lack of consensus and to considerations of 
tolerance to support their position. Thus, in 1979, on the floor of the House of Representatives, Congresswoman 
Ferraro said, "As a Catholic, I accept the premise that a fertilized ovum is a baby… [but] I have no right to impose 
my beliefs on [others]."6 The suggestion here seems to be that since the view that the fertilized ovum has full 
moral rights is based on a religious belief that is apparently not shared by the majority of Americans, it would be 
wrong to enact legislation based on that belief. Officials of the Catholic Church find this position unconvincing. 
Bishop James W. Malone, president of the National Conference of Catholic Bishops, rejects this view as "simply 
not logically tenable" and suggests that those who say that "their personal views should not influence their policy 
decisions" are confused.7 Now, of course, if the position of Catholic officials who personally oppose abortion but 
do not favor its legal prohibition were based on the view that personal beliefs should never influence policy 
decisions, then they would be guilty of confusion. But their view need not be based on such an extreme claim. 
 
It is more charitable to attribute to these officials the view that immorality is not a sufficient condition for making 
an action illegal. Nearly everyone will agree that it would be much too intrusive and too cumbersome to have the 
coercive arm of the law trying to prohibit all immoral acts. Breaking a trivial promise may be immoral, but we do 
not want the law enforcing such precepts. This reply to the criticism of Bishop Malone seems fine in the abstract, 
but for the particular issue in question it falls short. Even if not all immoral acts ought to be legally-proscribed, 
surely serious (or grave) immoral acts ought to be forbidden by law. And with respect to the issue in question, 
Catholic public officials regard the act of abortion as the killing of an innocent human being with full moral 
rights. If any precept ought to be enforced, this one should be. So simply distinguishing between acts that are 
regarded as immoral and those that ought to be made illegal will not provide an adequate defense against the 
objection in question. 
 
Another move that might be considered is to distinguish between knowledge and faith. Within the Catholic 
tradition, some things, including some moral smatters, are regarded as knowable though the use of reason alone. 
Some matters, however, are taken to be articles of faith. A Catholic public official might plausibly maintain that it 
is justifiable to enforce that part of morality which is accessible to all through the exercise of reason, but not 
appropriate to enforce that part of (Catholic) morality that depends on religious faith, especially in a society where 
religious pluralism reigns. This position may be plausible for some cases; it seems, however, that it will not serve 
liberal Catholic legislators who support permissive abortion laws. Surely they will not be willing to say that the 
wrongness of abortion is simply an article of faith. It seems, rather, that if they are to be true to their religious 
tradition, they must say that the wrongness of abortion is part of the natural law, knowable to all who exercise 
reason properly. 
 
There is a line of thought closely related to the one just sketched that liberal Catholic officials might consider. 
Some defending permissive abortion laws have argued that the moral status of the fetus is undecidable.8 Whether 
this undecidability is extended to other moral issues may be left an open question; but at least the moral status of 
fetuses cannot be established. If it is granted that no view of the moral status of fetuses can have a rational 
foundation, then it seems to follow that this is merely a matter of taste. And if one also grants that in a pluralistic 
society diversity in matters of taste should be tolerated, then it follows that the legal policy that such a society 
should adopt is to allow each woman the freedom to choose abortion if she wishes. But at least two problems 
prevent liberal Catholics from embracing this position. First, this view regards the moral status of the fetus as a 
subjective matter, one to which there is no correct answer, and that is not compatible with their religious 
tradition.9 One can modify this aspect of the position, of course. Instead of saying that there is no correct view of 
the moral status of the fetus, we can imagine the position making the more modest claim that the correct view is 
not known. This leads to the second problem, however, namely, that to say this may put conservatives (on 
abortion) in an even stronger position than liberals. For conservatives can argue that until we know the moral 
status of fetuses, we should adopt what is morally the least risky social policy.10 And a restrictive abortion policy 
is less risky, as the following line of reasoning purports to show. If we enact restrictive abortion laws and it turns 
out that fetuses do not have moral rights, then we have inappropriately restricted the freedom of women. If we 
enact permissive abortion laws and it turns out that human fetuses have the full complement of moral rights, then 
we will have allowed mass homicide. Since the latter is the graver wrong, in the absence of knowledge of the 
moral status of fetuses, the less risky social policy is to enact restrictive abortion laws. 
 
Part III 
Apparently not all religions share the Catholics' opposition to abortion; indeed, it seems that the majority of the 
people in the United States believe that abortion is at least sometimes permissible. Of course, this does not make 
abortion right; but a lack of moral consensus may put constraints on the content of the law. One might say that 
those who oppose abortion absolutely have not yet convinced the majority that this is a fundamental moral truth 
that must be legally enforced. In the absence of consensus and when the moral belief in question is tied so closely 
to religion, the importance of freedom of religion suggests that enforcing this belief would be an inappropriate 
intrusion. All religious sects in the United States have good reason to protect freedom of belief. Even if a 
particular sect were able to impose one of its cherished beliefs on others, it might well be the object of such 
imposition with regard to some other important belief.11 The same forces that might join Catholics in legally 
banning abortions may later conspire with others to implement forced sterilization in certain cases (for example, 
when a welfare mother has given birth to more than one illegitimate child). Thus, preserving one's own freedom 
of religious belief may require one to tolerate a state of affairs in which some of one's more central beliefs do not 
have the force of positive law. 
 
This rationale seems to avoid the pitfalls of the others noted earlier. Still, something about this position seems 
puzzling. Remember, liberal Catholics are trying to defend their support of abortion laws. It is one thing to work 
against the enactment of permissive abortion laws and, in the face of defeat, to acknowledge that one must 
tolerate such policies until one can convince the majority of their wrongness.12 It is another thing altogether, 
though, to say that a piece of legislation permits seriously immoral behavior, but to support it because one has not 
yet convinced most others of its heinousness. Others are not likely to take one's preachings seriously if one's votes 
are not in accord with those preachings. But in addition to this practical point, this position seems to be open to 
the objection that its proponents are guilty of moral compromise, and it is this criticism that I wish to explore 
further.13  
 
To say that someone is guilty of moral compromise suggests that that activity is wrong, and that is the point that 
the critic wishes to make. In some contexts compromise seems perfectly reasonable, and one such context is the 
Political arena. If the President and the minority party in Congress favor a budget that allocates X dollars for 
defense and the majority party in Congress prefers a budget that gives Y dollars for defense, it seems not 
implausible for bargaining to occur and for the parties to agree on a figure somewhere between X and Y. Of 
course, in this case and many similar to it, one might say that what is being compromised are interests, not 
principles.14 But even if one does regard this issue as a matter of principle (say, distributive justice), compromise 
need not be ruled out because, given the high budgetary figures and the factual complexities, one can hardly be 
confident about exact figures and percentages on such matters. But if liberal Catholics compromise so readily on 
the abortion issue, there does seem to be some reason to question their moral integrity (or their moral sincerity). 
 
There is one obvious way to block the charge that compromise is an indication of lost moral integrity. If one 
maintains that, in certain situations, one ought to compromise, then one who does compromise in those situations 
can hardly be charged with lacking moral integrity (though he might be accused of having false moral beliefs),15 
One may have a position on a given moral issue, but if that issue is a matter of social policy and there is serious 
disagreement about it, these are additional considerations that may be relevant to determining what one ought, all 
things considered, to do. Compromising on a matter of principle may be motivated by the desire to resolve an 
issue peacefully, to show respect for those who hold a conflicting position (which prevents one from imposing 
one's views on others), and to maintain self-respect (which prevents one from capitulating completely). In a case 
like this, not only has our compromiser not lost his moral integrity, but he regards compromising as necessary for 
maintaining that integrity. I want to emphasize two points, then: (i) that the conscientious person need not eschew 
all compromises, only certain ones; and (ii) that compromise is neither inherently evil (as the critic holds) nor 
inherently good (as some others might think),16 Whether all of this will help liberal Catholics, however, is 
something that must be investigated. 
 
Part IV 
What might lead one to compromise on the abortion issue? Several possibilities come to mind. One is that an 
individual may be uncertain about his position on the abortion question.17 A person may have doubts about some 
of the premises he employs to arrive at the conclusion that abortion is always wrong, or he may think that the 
arguments of his opponents are as plausible as his own. Uncertainties of this sort may prompt one to agree to a 
middle ground between the extreme of one's own and one's opponent. However, this position seems very similar 
to ones described earlier, and it does not seem to be one that liberal Catholics can readily embrace. It is hardly 
compatible with Catholicism to doubt whether the human fetus has the right to life. 
 
Another possibility should be explored, though. Liberal Catholics may hold firmly that human fetuses have the 
right to life and agree that this establishes the prima facie wrongness of abortion. They may believe, however, that 
restricting a woman s access to abortion conflicts with some other principle(s) they hold. Thus they have doubts 
that abortion is always, all things considered, wrong. They may hold, for example, that no one is morally required 
(nor should be legally compelled) to help another unless he has voluntarily incurred that obligation. And, the 
argument might continue, at least in cases where pregnancy is due to rape or failure of a reliable method of birth 
control, the woman has not voluntarily incurred an obligation to aid the fetus. In these cases, at least, a woman's 
right to freedom permits her to extract the fetus from her womb; or, to put it another way, the human fetus's right 
to life does not automatically give it the right to use another's body.18 We must be careful in saying what version 
of this argument we might attribute to liberal Catholics. For construed one way, the argument purports to show 
that abortion in many cases is morally permissible, and that I assume Catholics wish to deny. What they want to 
maintain is that though abortion is immoral it ought not to be illegal. Thus, for them to adhere to the libertarian-
like position just sketched, they might maintain that people are morally required to help others but that the law 
ought not to enforce this requirement. In effect, they would oppose Good Samaritan laws or laws based on the 
welfare principle.19 This position, I think, is coherent, but it does not seem to be a view that the liberal Catholics I 
have in mind can actually endorse. In particular there are two problems. First, the interpretation of the right to life 
on this libertarian account seems too weak. If the fetus’s right to life does not even give it the right to use the 
pregnant woman's body, then surely Catholics must wonder whether the right to life has been properly 
understood. And second, the liberal Catholics whose position we are discussing can hardly be categorized as 
contemporary libertarians. They have not generally opposed legislation based on the welfare principle. So, though 




There is another moral principle to which liberal Catholics might appeal and which may lead them to oppose the 
legal prohibition of abortion. This is the principle of tolerance. Perhaps not surprisingly, John Rawls can be of 
some assistance here. His argument, in A Theory of Justice, for equal liberty of conscience may provide liberal 
Catholics with a principled basis for their position. Rawls argues that parties in the original position behind the 
veil of ignorance will choose a principle allowing each freedom of belief and practice with regard to moral and 
religious views.20 Toleration is not adopted as a compromise or from political necessity, but rather is said to 
follow from the fact that each should be extended equal liberty. And if equal liberty of conscience is granted to 
all, then “from the standpoint of the original position, no particular interpretation of religious truth can be 
acknowledged as binding upon citizens generally . . . Each person must insist upon an equal right to decide what 
his religious obligations are.”21 It does not follow from this that any action based on a religious belief will be 
permitted. Religious practice must be limited when it is necessary to protect others. As Rawls puts it, "Moral and 
religious freedom follows from the principle of equal liberty; and…the only ground for denying the equal liberties 
is to avoid an even greater injustice, an even greater loss of liberty."22 And Rawls makes it clear that he means for 
this to be a necessary condition for limiting liberty when he writes, “The limitation of liberty is justified only 
when it is necessary for liberty itself, to prevent an invasion of freedom that would be still worse.”23 An example 
of such limitation is provided by our own society. Though adult Jehovah's Witnesses are permitted to refuse blood 
transfusions for themselves, they are not permitted to refuse such lifesaving therapy for their children. 
 
Now one might grant all of this and still maintain that it will not help liberal Catholics. Even if, based on moral or 
religious beliefs, some regard aborting the human fetus as permissible, it seems that Catholics must regard that act 
as a violation of a being's right to life. And if so, then the Rawlsian condition necessary for justifying restriction of 
freedom—namely, to prevent an invasion of freedom that is even worse—is satisfied. Protecting the right to life 
of a being would seem to warrant preventing others from acting on moral or religious beliefs (as the example of 
Jehovah's Witnesses and blood transfusions suggests). But liberal Catholics have a retort to this one that will 
enable them to maintain the belief that abortion is immoral but ought not to be forbidden by law. As stated earlier, 
in Rawls' liberal political theory a necessary condition for the restriction of liberty of conscience is to prevent 
damage to public order or to prevent an even worse invasion of liberty. But this is not the only condition that must 
be satisfied. 
 
Furthermore, liberty of conscience is to be limited only when there is a reasonable expectation that not 
doing so will damage the public order which the government should maintain. This expectation must be 
based on evidence and ways of reasoning acceptable to all. It must be supported by ordinary observation 
and modes of thought (including the methods of rational scientific inquiry where these are not 
controversial) which are generally recognized as correct.24 
 
In effect, then, freedom of conscience may be restricted only if it is believed that not doing so will damage the 
public order, and this belief is shared by nearly all or the belief is based on evidence or methods of reasoning 
acceptable to nearly all. The belief that human fetuses have the right to life from the moment of conception is 
clearly not shared by all. Perhaps it is premature to affirm or to deny that this belief is based on evidence 
acceptable to nearly all. But it is not premature to say that many have not accepted or believed the evidence, if 
there is any evidence, for this claim, Thus if liberal Catholics adopt this Rawlsian position, they can maintain their 
belief that abortion is Unmoral, but (for now) hold that there should not be restrictive abortion laws. And this in 
no way compromises their moral integrity. 
 
But even this further elaboration of the Rawlsian position is not enough to save liberal Catholics. At least two 
criticisms are likely to be raised. And while one of these can be answered, the other may prove to be quite 
damaging. First, some may accuse liberal Catholics of a blatant inconsistency. They seem to be saying that 
abortion is wrong but that it ought to be permitted. This appearance of contradiction can be eliminated, however. 
As was noted earlier, it makes sense to distinguish between behavior that one thinks is wrong and behavior that 
one thinks ought to be prohibited by positive law. One can say consistently that it is wrong to use artificial 
methods of birth control and wrong not to worship, and yet maintain that in a pluralistic democracy that these 
matters should not be regulated by the state. In effect, this is to adopt a second-order principle for choosing social 
policies that overrides one's first-order moral principles.25 
 
This leads to a second and more serious problem, however. Most who have commended moral compromise and 
who have argued that it need not detract from one's integrity have acknowledged that there are moral limits on 
compromise; not just any principle may be compromised.26 One hopes, for example, that most of us will not be 
willing to compromise with persons who believe that slavery or genocide is permissible. Yet it seems that liberal 
Catholics are compromising a principle that has just this status. After all, they regard abortion as the killing of an 
innocent human being. How can they approve of laws that permit such killings, even if these laws are favored by 
the majority? Indeed, because abortion is regarded by Catholics as so heinous, one should expect them to do many 
things to discourage abortions. At the very least, they (and other opponents of abortion) should support aid to 
pregnant women, programs that promote adoption of unwanted children, and aid to unwed mothers and their 
children. One might even think that they would regard themselves as justified in taking more extreme steps—for 
example, doing damage to abortion clinics. 
 
Opponents of abortion adhere to a first-order principle which, it seems, instructs them to work for the abolition of 
abortions. Call this a principle of conscientiousness. Some, however, may also be committed to a second-order 
principle, one which counsels them to compromise on social policies regarding which there is widespread 
disagreement. Call this a principle of compromise. This now provides us with a different way of stating the 
second problem. Setting social policies in a democratic society does require individuals to compromise some of 
their first-order principles. But to endorse the view that any first-order principle may be overridden by the 
principle of compromise is implausible. Some principles are so fundamental that a willingness to compromise on 
them does threaten an agent's moral integrity; and such is the principle concerning which liberal Catholics must 
compromise.27 This is not simply because the principle has a religious basis, but rather because of the alleged 
gravity of the evil specified by the principle. 
 
Part VI 
If what I have argued is correct, the obvious ways of defending the position of public officials who privately 
oppose abortion but who support permissive abortion laws are flawed or at least open to serious question. Let us 
be careful not to overstate what follows from this, however. This certainly does not show that such public officials 
have a bad moral character. Nor, of course, does it even show that this position is indefensible. There may be 
other, more plausible ways to defend the view that I have overlooked. But until such a defense is advanced, liberal 
Catholics (and others similarly situated) have reason to worry about the credibility of their position. 
 
At the philosophical level, what I have argued advances neither conservatism nor liberalism on the abortion issue. 
After all, the most that follows from what I have said is that liberal Catholics should abandon either their support 
of permissive abortion laws or their Catholicism. At the political level, however, conservatives are likely to be 
happier with the results of this investigation. Typically, a greater diversity of supporters brings about greater 
political strength. And certainly support from some Catholics has seemed to add political strength to liberalism on 
abortion. If that support is shown to be unavailable, it is reasonable to speculate that the liberal position will be 
weakened politically. If this is a consequence of what I argue here, it is one that, at the outset, was neither 
foreseen nor intended.28 
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